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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robin Belden was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver following a jury trial. All of the State's evidence supporting this conviction
resulted from a search of Mr. Belden's residence pursuant to a warrant. However, this
warrant was modified from the original warrant that had been initially issued for another
residence entirely. While Mr. Belden had earlier sought to suppress all of the evidence
obtained under this warrant, asserting that the magistrate lacked probable cause to
modify the warrant to authorize a search of Mr. Belden's residence, his motion to
suppress was denied. Mr. Belden timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and
sentence, and asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his home.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Police sought a warrant to execute a search on a mobile home described as
located at "1100 Kootenai Cutoff Road, Space number twenty-three." (5/2/07 Search
Warrant Hearing Tr.1, p.1, Ls.10-18.) At the initial warrant hearing, Officer Chris Higbee
testified that he believed this residence was associated with Mr. Belden. (5/2/07 Search
Warrant Hearing Tr., p.1, Ls.19-21.) The officer's basis of knowledge came from two
sources: an unnamed confidential informant and another officer who purportedly
1

Because there are multiple transcripts of proceedings, for ease of reference, any
citations to the transcripts will be made in accordance with the date of the proceeding.
Additionally, because there were two different hearings regarding the issuance of the
search warrant in this case, citations to these hearings will be made with reference to
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observed the informant enter the home where an alleged drug buy occurred. (5/2/07
Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.1, L.22 - p.8, L.3.)
The unnamed informant was working with police in order to reduce her own
pending drug charges.

(5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.4-11.)

Officer

Higbee represented that he could not vouch for the informant's credibility, but that he
thought the informant would have knowledge about local drug activity from the fact that
she was facing drug charges. 2 (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.8-16.) The
informant told police that she could arrange a drug buy from a man named "Robin" who
had faced prior criminal charges for some unspecified offense. (5/2/07 Search Warrant
Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.1-10.) After police conducted a search for all males with the first
name "Robin" who had recent involvement with the court system, the informant picked
Mr. Belden's photo out of some of the photos of the individuals identified.

(5/2/07

Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.8-10.)
Officer Higbee represented to the court that police had conducted "visual
surveillance" of the drug buy arranged through the confidential informant.. (5/2/07
Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.11-14.) He testified that another officer personally
observed the unnamed informant "Go to the door of space number twenty three of this
mobile home park in Ponderay." (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.15-18.)
While there was apparently an audio recording made of the alleged drug buy, none of

whether the hearing was the search warrant hearing or the modification hearing that
both took place on May 2, 2007.
2
The transcript reflects that Officer Higbee was asked whether he could "vouwge" for
the unnamed confidential informant's credibility. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing
Tr., p.2, Ls.8-11.) However, the surrounding context of the question, and Officer
Higbee's response, make clear that the officer was being asked whether he could vouch
for the credibility of the informant.
2

the officers were familiar with Mr. Belden's voice and Officer Higbee testified that the
recording made was "semi-poor". (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.4,
L.21.) At the point on the recording where the purported drug buy supposedly took
place, Officer Higbee represented to the court that the recording was difficult to hear
because there was interference with the audio.

(5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing

Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.5, L.3.) Officer Higbee did hear the other individual on the recording
make a comment about dividing up or weighing a substance, but there was no specific
conversation about requesting a quantity of marijuana. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing
Tr., p.5, Ls.4-16.)

The unnamed informant, who did not have any drugs in her

possession before entering the mobile home, returned with a substance that field tested
as positive for marijuana. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.4, Ls.10-12, p.5, L.17
- p.6, L.1.)
In support of his application for a search warrant at the hearing, Officer Higbee
provided the court with photographs of the mobile home located at space 23 of the
mobile home park.

(5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.7, Ls.5-9.) Although the

officer stated that he was not the officer who conducted visual surveillance of the
controlled drug buy, Officer Higbee did relate that, "Detective Flowe! who was assisting
with that portion did see that and did tell me that that's their residence where the
individual went in." (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.7, Ls.16-21.)
Based upon the testimony of Officer Higbee, the magistrate concluded that there
was probable cause to believe that the mobile home located at space 23 contained
evidence of possession or delivery of marijuana.

(5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing

Tr., p.8, Ls.6-12.) The court then issued a warrant to search the mobile home located in

3

space 23, and attached the photos that Officer Higbee provided of this home to the
warrant. (R., pp.7-10.)
No one was home at the mobile home that was located in space 23, so officers
forced entry into the residence. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1,
Ls.11-22; Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, p.4.) It was immediately apparent to
the officers executing the warrant that the layout of this residence did not match the
description of the interior that was provided by the unnamed confidential informant.
((5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, Ls.20-22.) Officer Higbee then
spied a bill next to a phone in the house and discovered the name on the bill was not
Mr. Belden's. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, Ls.22-23.) Upon
speaking to the manager of the mobile home park, the officers learned that Mr. Belden's
residence was two houses away, in space 25.

(5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification

Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.15-23.) Unlike the home located in space 23, which was blue-gray,
the home located in space 25 was tan with brown trim.

(5/2/07 Search Warrant

Modification Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.6-14.)
At the modification hearing, Officer Higbee provided a different account of the
information that linked the alleged criminal activity - the drug buy - to the home located
in space 23 of the mobile home park. Whereas before he had asserted several times
that another officer had personally observed the drug buy at that location, Officer
Higbee now claimed that all of the information about the home at space 23 came from
the unnamed informant and prior case notes about a misdemeanor probationer named

4

"Hans" that the officer claimed was Mr. Belden's roommate. 3 (5/2/07 Search Warrant
Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, L.23 - p.2, L.5.) There was no testimony provided to the
magistrate that would tend to link the mobile home at space 25 with the drug buy that
Mr. Belden was alleged to have participated in the night before. (See 5/2/07 Search
Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., generally.)
Despite hearing no evidence that could explain the prior representations that
another officer had observed the drug buy taking place at space 23, nor asking any
questions as to how it was that these representations came to be made, the magistrate
simply modified the warrant to indicate that police could search the home located in
space 25, rather than space 23. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.2,
L.24 - p.3, L.2.) The magistrate also asked the prosecutor if he would prefer her to
cross out the pictures of the home at space 23 that were attached to the original
warrant. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.1-2.) The court did
so and added in the description that the house at space 25 was "tan with brown trim two mobile homes to the East of#23." (R., pp.13-16.)
When police executed this modified warrant, they discovered a half ounce of
marijuana, two pipes, a mason jar containing marijuana residue, four baggies, and a
scale in Mr. Belden's bedroom. (5/4/07 Tr., p.4, Ls.3-14.) There was also a mason jar
that contained "a quantity of marijuana" in Mr. Belden's closet. (5/4/07 Tr., p.4, Ls.2124.) Upon being contacted by police, Mr. Belden apparently acknowledged that he was

3

It appears that Officer Higbee never actually spoke to the man identified as "Hanst but
instead "pulled up" the prior case notes associated with this individual's misdemeanor
probation. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.2, L.2.)
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a personal user of marijuana and that he sometimes traded pot to other people for the
price that he purchased it himself. (5/4/07 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-8.)
Mr. Belden was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana) with intent to deliver. (R., pp.36-37.) He filed a motion to suppress all of
the State's evidence because there was no probable cause to support the issuance of
the search warrants in his case. (R., p.60; Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, pp.16.)

Mr. Belden brought this motion under both the Idaho State and the federal

constitutions. (R., p.60.)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Mr. Belden brought to the court's
attention the fact that specific representations were made to the district court at the
initial search warrant hearing that a police officer had personally observed the unnamed
confidential informant enter into the mobile home in space 23, and coupled these
representations with an address, a description, and pictures that were specific to this
unit. (10/22/07 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-9.) He also pointed out that there was never any evidence
presented that specifically linked the mobile home at space 25 to the alleged buy that
formed the basis for the warrant. (10/22/07 Tr., p.8, L.11 - p.10, l.19.) Moreover, the
only new information that was presented to the magistrate merely connected this
residence to Mr. Belden. (10/22/07 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-13.) In light of the false information
that was presented to the magistrate in support of the initial issuance of the warrant,
and the failure to provide any reasoned explanation for the provision of this false
information, Mr. Belden asserted that there was no longer any probable cause that
would support the issuance of the amended warrant and that both the confidential
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informant and the officers lacked credibility. (10/22/07 Tr., p. 28, L.6- p.29, L.10, p.30,
Ls.3-23.)
The district court at the suppression hearing expressed concerns about the
complete failure of the State to explain provide an explanation for the presentation of
testimony that an officer observed the drug buy occur at the home occupying space 23.
(10/22/07 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.2.) Mr. Belden pointed out that no attempt was made
to "rehabilitate" the testimony that had been provided earlier regarding the officer's
purported observations at unit 23.

(10/22/07 Tr., p.13, Ls.15-21.) Despite this, the

prosecutor attempted to provide a hypothetical to the district court as to what may have
happened. (10/22/07 Tr., p.15, L.18 - p.16, L.7.) The court correctly noted that this
assertion was purely speculative and, in any case, was a version of events that was
never presented to the magistrate and therefore could not be used in support of the
probable cause determination for either warrant. (10/22/07 Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.3.)
The district court then asked the prosecutor what evidence was presented to the
magistrate "that shows Detective Flavel really saw the defendant go into No. 25 which is
different in color than 23." (10/22/07 Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23.) The State never identified
any such information, but merely asserted that it was night at the time that the officer
purported to have observed the drug buy, and the court could take that factor into
account. (10/22/07 Tr., p.19, L.24 - p.20, L.2.)
After hearing the arguments of the parties and taking a brief recess, the district
court concluded that, "a purchase from the confidential informant occurred and that it
involved Robin Belden." (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.5-7.) The court further concluded that
this buy did not occur at the home located in space 23 and that there was no
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explanation for why the mistaken identification or description of the mobile home was
provided to the magistrate. (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.8.)
The court then articulated that it was relying on case law from Idaho and around
the country, "involving vehicles and nighttime and mistaken descriptions." (10/22/07
Tr., p.33, Ls.19-23.)

The district court never specified which specific cases it was

relying on. (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.19-23.) The court found that, "a buy did occur and if
it didn't occur at 25 it occurred very close to 25."

(10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.23-24.)

Additionally, the court noted that the location of Mr. Belden's home, "is very close to the
mistaken number of 23 and it was, in fact, 25. And wherever the buy occurred it had to
occur very close to 25. I think that's a fair inference." (10/22/07 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-10.)
While noting that it was, "a bit of a close case," the district court denied Mr. Belden'$
motion to suppress. 4

(10/22/07 Tr., p.34, Ls.15-16, p.35, Ls.3-4.)

In doing so, the

district court held that, "it's reasonable to search the residence even if the buy occurred
at a different place in close proximity to his residence." (10/22/07 Tr., p.34, L.25 - p.35,
L.2.)
At trial, Officer Higbee testified that he searched Mr. Belden's home pursuant to a
search warrant and found a rolled up baggie containing marijuana, two pipes, a loose
marijuana bud on a table, and a mason jar that contained marijuana located behind a
wall accessible through an electrical panel. (12/10/07 Tr., p.70, L.1 - p.79, L.2, p.79,
Ls.16-21.) The officer also testified that he found a scale and several baggies that he
believed were used in the weighing and packaging of marijuana for sale. (12/10/07
Tr., p.79, L.3 - p.80, L.11.) A state forensic scientist testified that testing of a sample

8

taken from Mr. Belden's residence tested positive for marijuana. (12/10/07 Tr., p.118,
L.23-p.119, L.4, p.125, L.23-p.126, L.18.)
Officer Higbee also testified that, after executing the search warrant on
Mr. Belden's home, he spoke to Mr. Belden, who admitted to using marijuana and
occasionally "trading" marijuana for money.

5

(12/10/07 Tr., p.102, L.23 - p.103, L.15.)

Mr. Belden also explained that most of the marijuana he had purchased was for his own
personal use. (12/10/07 Tr., p.105, Ls.5-12.)
Mr. Belden was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.
(12/10/07 Tr., p.165, Ls.12-24; R., p.71.) He was sentenced to two years, with one year
fixed, and the district court retained jurisdiction. 6 (R., pp.96-98.)

Mr. Belden timely

appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., pp.96, 110.)

4

While the district court orally denied this motion at the suppression hearing, the
court's written order on this motion was not entered until April 16, 2008. (R., p.108.)
5
There was an additional hearing regarding the State's !.C.R. 404(b) notice that it
intended to use Mr. Belden's statements to police regarding his own past marijuana use
and past "trading" in marijuana for money. (See 12/7/07 Tr., generally.) Because
Mr. Belden does not challenge on appeal the district court's ruling that these statements
were admissible to show knowledge and intent, the full arguments and course of
rroceedings for this hearing are not described herein.
Execution of Mr. Belden's judgment of conviction and sentence in this case has been
stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. (R., p.106.)
9

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Belden's motion to suppress the State's
evidence because the district court applied the wrong legal standard to its determination
of the lawfulness of the search; there was no nexus between the alleged crime and the
place to be searched; the State either intentionally presented false evidence in support
of the issuance of the warrant or presented evidence with reckless disregard for its
truth; and there was no evidence that could support a finding of veracity of the unnamed
confidential informant?

10

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Belden's Motion To Suppress The State's
Evidence Because The District Court Applied The Wrong Legal Standard To Its
Determination Of The Lawfulness Of The Search: There Was No Nexus Between The
Alleged Crime And The Place To Be Searched: The State Either Intentionally Presented
False Evidence In Support Of The Issuance Of The Warrant. Or Presented False
Evidence With Reckless Disregard For Its Truth: And There Was No Evidence That
Could Support A Finding Of Veracity Of The Unnamed Confidential Informant

A.

Introduction
Mr. Belden asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to

suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his home pursuant to
a modified warrant.

First, the district court erroneously applied legal principles from

cases involving the search of vehicles and further erroneously determined that probable
cause to search a home can be established if there is criminal activity that occurs
nearby.

Second, there is nothing in the information that was presented to the

magistrate, either at the initial probable cause hearing or at the hearing to modify the
warrant, that could establish a nexus between the alleged crime, the evidence sought to
be seized, and Mr. Belden's residence. Third, the State either intentionally or recklessly
presented false information that was material to the determination of probable cause in
support of its application for the initial warrant, and made no effort to rehabilitate the
information presented at the subsequent modification hearing. Finally, there was no
evidence that would support a finding of the veracity or the basis of knowledge of the
unnamed confidential informant in this case, and the subsequent information provided
by police was either erroneous or lacked any discernible connection to Mr. Belden and
his home. In light of all of these deficiencies with the underlying warrants in this case,

11

there is no substantial basis upon which probable cause could have reasonably been
found and the district court erred when it denied Mr. Belden's motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Legal Standards
Upon review of a district court's decision to grant or deny a suppression motion,

the determination of whether a search violated the Fourth Amendment is a question of
law that this Court reviews de novo. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 469,
197 P.3d 327, 330 (Ct. App. 2008).

While the ultimate issue of whether a Fourth

Amendment violation has occurred is reviewed de novo, this Court will uphold any
factual findings by the district court unless these findings are clearly erroneous. Id.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that, "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

"Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth
Amendment, except that 'oath or affirmation' is termed 'affidavit."'7 State v. Ramos, 142
Idaho 628, 630, 130 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005).
In reviewing a magistrate's determination of probable cause, this Court looks to
the warrant affidavit submitted to the court, or the transcript of the testimony presented,
to determine whether it provided the court with a substantial basis for concluding that

7

Because the same test applies for probable cause under both the federal and the
Idaho constitutions, Mr. Belden does not separately analyze the district court's rulings
regarding this issue under each constitutional provision. See State v. Schaffer, 133
Idaho 126, 133, 982 P.2d 961, 968 (Ct. App. 1999).
12

probable cause existed. 8 State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686, 85 P.3d 656, 662 (2004).
This Court applies a "totality of the circumstances" test and resolves doubt in favor of
the validity of the warrant. Id.
C.

The District Court Applied The Wrong Legal Standards In Determining The
Lawfulness Of The Search Of Mr. Belden's Residence
The district court at the suppression hearing case abused its discretion and

committed legal error by applying erroneous legal standards to two aspects of its
ultimate determination that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this case: first,
the district court erroneously relied on case law that dealt with, "vehicles and nighttime
and mistaken descriptions;" and, second, the district court erroneously concluded that
mere proximity to suspected criminal activity is sufficient to give rise to probable cause
to search a residence. (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.19-23; p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.2) (emphasis
added.)
It is very well established that searches involving vehicles - usually undertaken
under the so-called "automobile exception" - are subject to fundamentally different
standards than are searches of homes. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390394 (1985). This distinction between automobiles and homes is grounded primarily in
two bases.

First, automobiles have the capacity to be quickly moved.

Id. at 390.

Second, people have a reduced expectation of privacy in automobiles than in homes
due to greater exposure of the interior of cars as well as the pervasive regulation of
vehicles. Id. at 391-392.

8

In Idaho, testimony at a probable cause hearing in support of a search warrant can
take the place of an affidavit of probable cause. See Yager, 139 Idaho at 686, 85 P.3d
at 662.
13

In sharp contrast to the reduced expectations of privacy and Fourth Amendment
protections that attach to searches of vehicles, it is equally well-established that private
homes receive the highest protections of the Fourth Amendment. "It is axiomatic that
the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed."'

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (quoting

U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). Simply put, the basic Fourth
Amendment principles that are attendant on searches of vehicles are fundamentally
different than those that apply to a search of a home; and therefore the district court
should not have relied on case law governing the search of vehicles in determining
whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred in this case. 9
Additionally, the district court erroneously concluded that, "it's reasonable to
search the residence even if the buy occurred at a different place in close proximity to
his residence." (10/22/07 Tr., p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.2.) This is an incorrect statement of
the law. Probable cause to suspect that criminal activity is occurring near a residence is
insufficient to establish the required nexus between the place to be searched and the
evidence sought.

See U.S. v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004). As is

discussed more fully below, the required nexus is between the alleged criminal activity
and the actual location to be searched. See Yager, 139 Idaho at 686, 85 P.3d at 662.
Criminal activity nearby is not sufficient.

9

This Court may also wish to note that the district court failed to articulate either which
cases involving vehicles, mistakes, and nighttime that the court was relying on; or what
the significant holdings of these cases are. (10/22107 Tr., p.33, L.19 - p.34, L.14.)
14

D.

The Initial Testimony And Resulting Search Warrant Identified What Was
Apparently The Wrong Location And There Was No Subsequent Nexus
Presented In Support Of The Warrant To Connect Mr. Belden's Residence To
The Underlying Alleged Criminal Activity Or Items To Be Seized
Mr. Belden asserts that the facts presented to the magistrate at the initial warrant

hearing and at the subsequent hearing on the modification of the warrant failed to
establish the required nexus between his residence, the underlying crime alleged, and
the evidence to be seized.
In order to provide an adequate basis to support a determination of probable
cause, the facts presented in the affidavit or testimony of the officer must establish a
sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal activity, the things to be seized, and the
place to be searched. State v. Sorbet, 124 Idaho 275, 278, 858 P.2d 814, 817 (Ct. App.
1993). "Most courts require that a nexus between the items to be seized and the place
to be searched must be established by specific facts; an officer's general conclusions
are not enough." Yager, 139 Idaho at 686, 85 P.3d at 662.
An incorrect address for a warrant to search a premise may invalidate a search
warrant.

Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 159, 857 P.2d 634, 638 (Ct. App. 1993).

"However, inaccurate directions to the premises to be searched will not make the seized
evidence inadmissible if a reasonable officer could ascertain and identify the place to be
searched." Id. And police have a duty under the Fourth Amendment to provide the
correct "particulars" describing the place to be searched to the magistrate.

U.S. v.

Collins, 830 F.2d 145, 145-146 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Collins decision is instructive for this Court regarding the underlying duty of
police to provide accurate information regarding the description of the place to be
searched. In Collins, the search warrant obtained by police was for a residence at "300
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Springdale Street," that was described as a white house with a dark roof that was the
"last house on the west side" of the street.

Collins, 830 F.2d at 145. When police

searched the house located at the specified street address, they did not find any
evidence of drugs or other criminal activity. Id. But this house was also not the last
house on the west side of the street. Id. That house was yellow-gold with a gray roof
and green trim. Id. When police searched the last house on the west side of the street,
they found a shed containing a methamphetamine laboratory. Id.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's determination that
the evidence resulting from the second search should not be suppressed. In doing so,
the Collins Court noted two things that are especially cogent for the search at issue in
this case.

First, the court noted that, "The evil guarded against by the Fourth

Amendment is doubled when the particularity of the warrant is an erroneous
particularity."

Id. at 146.

In other words, when a police officer provides both an

erroneous address and an erroneous description for the place to be searched, the
potential for a Fourth Amendment violation increases exponentially.

Here, the

magistrate was presented with a specific address, a specific description, and a set of
pictures that were all fundamentally different than Mr. Belden's residence.
Second, the Collins Court explained that the provision of this erroneous
information violated a fundamental duty of the officers to provide accurate and truthful
information in support of a search warrant, and the failure to do so misled the magistrate
who issued the warrant. Id. The court held:
There was not only a reasonable probability that another premise might
mistakenly be searched, but another premise was searched. They had an
address that they followed to the wrong house. The wrong address they
had was due to their own carelessness and lack of common prudence;
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they had not carried out their duty to get the right particulars; they did not
disclose what they had "a duty to discover and disclose."
Id. (quoting Ma,yland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987)).

Here, as in Collins, the officers provided to the magistrate issuing the warrant
what was apparently erroneous information: that an officer had personally observed the
unnamed informant enter into the home located at space 23 in order to perform a
controlled drug buy. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.15-18.) The officers
then provided a series of erroneous particularities to the court - a description and
pictures of this mobile home. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.7, Ls.5-9.) When
the officers returned to modify the warrant, they provided no reasoned explanation for
their dereliction. (See 5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., generally.) But,
even more important for this Court, they also provided no nexus that would connect the
home located in space 25 to the underlying criminal activity alleged or to the items that
officers expected to seize.
The only additional information that was provided to the magistrate in support of
issuing a modified warrant for the home located at space 25 was that the manager of
the mobile home park identified this location as Mr. Belden's residence. (5/2/07 Search
Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.15-23.) However, mere probable cause to
believe that a person has committed a crime does not, of itself, give rise to probable
cause to search that person's home. See State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637, 642, 873
P.2d 891, 896 (Ct. App. 1993). Here, the only nexus that existed in support of the
warrant issued for the home located at space 25 was a link between the individual that
officers suspected, Mr. Belden, and the location to be searched. There was no nexus
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established between the criminal activity alleged, the things to be seized, and
Mr. Belden's residence.
Some Idaho cases have recognized a limited exception to this rule, and found
that there may be probable cause to search a defendant's residence for evidence of
drug trafficking based on suspicions regarding the defendant, if the evidence presented
in support of the warrant indicates that the defendant is a regular drug trafficker.
State v. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho 278,287, 141 P.3d 1147, 1156 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis

added).

In O'Keefe, the evidence presented to the magistrate indicated that the

defendant maintained a sophisticated and large-scale marijuana grow operation at a
warehouse leased by the defendant. Id. at 288, 141 P.3d at 1157. Similarly, in State v.
Nunez, the Idaho Supreme Court held that there was a sufficient nexus to permit the

search of the defendant's residence where there was evidence of "non-stop," high
volume methamphetamine trafficking (in excess of $10,000 per day) and specific
information from a confidential informant that the defendant kept most of his drugs at his
home. State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 641-642, 67 P.3d 831, 836-837 (2003). But
essential to the finding of probable cause to search the defendant's residence in these
cases is the presentation of specific facts demonstrating regular and on-going drug
trade activities on the part of the defendant. See also State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670,
673, 84 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Ct. App. 2004).
There were no facts before the magistrate in this case that could support the
inference that Mr. Belden was a regular drug deafer who was engaged in a large-scale
drug manufacturing or trafficking trade. The sum total of the information presented to
the magistrate in support of the warrant regarding Mr. Belden's potential status as a
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drug dealer was that an unnamed confidential informant, working with police in order to
reduce her own charges, "believe[d] that they could buy marijuana from the person [the
officer] subsequently identified as Mr. Belden." (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.1,
L.22 - p.2, L.21.) The informant's belief that she could motivate Mr. Belden to sell her
marijuana provides no information as to Mr. Belden's history of significant drug
trafficking, nor does it in any way support an inference that Mr. Belden is a large-scale
drug dealer. As such, there is no factual basis from which the magistrate could have
found probable cause to issue a warrant to search Mr. Belden's residence exclusively
from the bare fact of the suspicion of police that he had sold a small amount of
marijuana to a confidential informant.
While the prosecutor presented theories to the district court at the suppression
hearing as to how this error might have occurred, this speculation is of no avail to
establishing any nexus between the alleged criminal activity and Mr. Belden's actual
residence located in space 25 of the mobile home park. (10/22/07 Tr., p.15, L.18 p.16, L.7, p.20, L.12 - p.21, L.3, p.22, L.13 - p.23, L.17.) It is undisputed there was no
evidence presented at the hearing seeking a modification of the search warrant that
provided any explanation at all for the prior testimony that an officer had personally
observed the drug buy take place at the home located at space 23, nor was there
additional testimony from the officer purportedly observing the drug buy that he had
witnessed the buy occurring at space 25. (See 10/22/07 Tr., generally.) In reviewing
the sufficiency of a nexus to support a finding of probable cause, this Court is limited to
a review of evidence that is actually presented to the issuing judge.

See, e.g.,

Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971) (insufficient affidavit in support of a
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warrant cannot be rehabilitated by subsequent testimony not disclosed to the issuing
magistrate); State v. Bohan, 864 P.2d 26, 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that
warrant containing wrong address must be evaluated under the actual facts of the case,
not in the hypothetical).

And, as has been noted, there is nothing in the evidence

presented to the district court that could sustain a finding of a nexus between the home
located at space 25 of the mobile home park and the underlying criminal activity alleged
or the evidence to be seized.
In light of this, the court lacked an adequate basis to establish probable cause for
the search of Mr. Belden's residence, and the district court erred when it denied
Mr. Belden's motion to suppress.
E.

The State Either Intentionally Presented False Information To The District Court
In Support .Of It Application For A Search Warrant, Or Presented False
Information With Reckless Disregard For Its Truth
Mr. Belden further asserts that the evidence garnered as a result of the search of

his home should have been suppressed because the record demonstrates the search
warrant was procured through the intentional or reckless presentation of false
information by the law enforcement officer at the probable cause hearing.
The Fourth Amendment requires not only a factual showing sufficient to establish
probable cause, but also that this factual showing is truthful. Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 164-165 (1978). "To have a warrant set aside on the ground that its issuance
was based on a false representation of material fact, the defendant must establish that
the false representation: (1) was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for truth; and (2) that the facts included or omitted were material to the
magistrate's finding of probable cause." Sorbet, 124 Idaho at 279, 858 P.2d at 818.
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The inclusion of false facts in the affidavit or testimony of the officer is material if,
without that information, probable cause would not have been found. Id. Whether the
misrepresentation of fact is material is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
Id.

Where the falsehoods presented were the result of negligence, rather than
recklessness, such information does not invalidate a warrant and may be considered
when reviewing the warrant for probable cause. State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 511, 927
P.2d 897, 901 (Ct. App. 1996). A false statement may be deemed reckless where the
statement falsely attributes to a witness a description of property or evidence that was
not, in fact, made by the witness.

Id. at 513, 927 P.2d at 903.

Whether a false

statement in support of an affidavit is intentional or reckless, as opposed to negligent,
may also be inferred by the relative importance of the information.

See State v.

Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 48, 981 P.2d 1154, 1158 (Ct. App. 1999).

Where an officer presents testimony at one hearing that is plainly and
unambiguously contradicted by that officer's testimony at a subsequent hearing, with no
plausible explanation provided for the discrepancy, the officer's testimony will be
deemed to plainly lack credibility on the face of the record. State v. Munoz, _

Idaho

_ , _P.3d _ , Supreme Court Docket No. 34149 (Ct. App. March 25, 2009), pp.68.10 And such a plain lack of credibility due to clearly contradictory testimony renders it
"impossible to give credence to either version" of events provided through the officer's
testimony. Id. at p.8.

10 As of the writing of this brief, the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion in Munoz has not
yet been released for publication in the permanent law reports, and is therefore subject
to revision or withdrawal.
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Here, there can be no meaningful debate that the magistrate who issued the
warrant was presented with information that was false. It was expressly represented to
the magistrate on more than one occasion at the initial search warrant hearing that an
officer had witnessed the confidential informant go into the home located as space 23 in
order to complete the arranged drug buy.

(5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3,

Ls.15-18, p.7, Ls.5-21.) Upon executing the initial warrant on this residence, the layout
of the interior did not match the description given and a bill sitting by the phone was
addressed to someone other than Mr. Belden.

(5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification

Hearing Tr., p.1, Ls.19-23.) With no explanation for his earlier statements, the officer
changed his story at the modification hearing to represent that the information regarding
the address of the home located at space 23 was actually relayed by the confidential
informant, rather than being established by the observations of the officer. 11 (5/2/07
Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, L.23-p.2, L.3.)
The fact of where the alleged drug buy occurred was material, and was virtually
the entire basis for the execution of the warrant at that address. The only connection
between the place to be searched and the underlying alleged criminal activity at the
initial warrant hearing was testimony representing that a police officer had seen the
arranged drug buy take place at this location. (See 5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing
Tr., generally.)

If Officer Higbee did, in fact, receive the information regarding the

11

The officer also stated that he had pulled up the case notes from an individual who
was believed to be Mr. Belden's roommate and who was on misdemeanor probation,
and that these notes indicated that the person believed to be his roommate resided at
the residence located at space 23. The officer does not specify who or what was the
source of the information indicating that this other individual was Mr. Belden's
roommate. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, L.23 - p.2, L.5.)
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specific address of the alleged drug buy from the unnamed confidential informant rather
than another police officer, then he intentionally misrepresented the source of this
information to the district court.

And the source of the information was particularly

important, given that the officer also testified at this same hearing that he could not
vouch for the informant's credibility. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.8-11.)
If the information regarding the location of the alleged drug buy did come from
the officer who observed it, then, at the very least, the provision of the false information
as to the address was reckless on the part of this officer. This error was compounded
when the officer then provided a description and photographs of the home located at
space 23, which was not Mr. Belden's home. See Collins, 830 F.2d at 145-146. The
address of the place to be searched is not a de minimus detail that holds no bearing for
the determination of probable cause. In this case, there could be no probable cause for
the warrant in absence of an identification of the proper place to be searched. As such,
the information regarding where the criminal activity allegedly occurred was the most
important piece of information in order to obtain a search warrant for that location. And
the police in this case never stated or implied at the modification hearing (or at any point
in the proceedings) that the officer actually observed any activity take place at
Mr. Belden's residence located at space 25. (See 5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification
Hearing Tr., generally.)

If the improperly submitted information - the erroneous

statement of where the drug buy occurred - is excised from the record, there is simply
no basis for a warrant to have issued in this case.
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F.

The Search Warrant Lacked Probable Cause Because There Was Insufficient
lndicia Of Reliability Or Veracity To Support The Allegations Made By The
Unnamed Confidential Informant
In this case, the magistrate was expressly told that police could not vouch for the

veracity of the unnamed confidential informant. It was solely the information provided
for the unnamed confidential informant that provided any basis to suspect Mr. Belden of
any criminal activity.

Because the totality of the circumstances reveal an insufficient

basis to find any veracity or reliability of the information obtained from the unnamed
informant, both the finding of probable cause to issue the warrants in this case, made in
part on reliance on the informant's statements, and the district court's ultimate finding
that a drug buy did occur and "it involved Robin Belden," lack substantial, competent
evidence in support of those findings. (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.5-7.)
"Where a warrant application is based in part upon the information provided by
an informant, factors supporting probable cause may include facts in the affidavit
indicating the reliability of the informant and the basis of the informant's knowledge."
Peterson, 133 Idaho at 47, 981 P.2d at 1157. These considerations are evaluated
under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 23, 56 P.3d
780, 785 (Ct. App. 2002). The factors of veracity and basis of knowledge, while not
strictly required, are especially important considerations in cases dealing with unnamed
informants. State v. Prestwich, 110 Idaho 966, 968, 719 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Ct. App.
1986). Where police are unable to vouch for the veracity of an unidentified confidential
informant, the information offered by that informant should be credited with little weight.

Id. In such cases, factual corroboration by law enforcement or independent evidence of
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incriminating details become critical. Id. at 969, 719 P.2d at 1229; State v. Patterson,
139 Idaho 858, 864, 87 P.3d 967, 973 (Ct. App. 2003).
In this case, the officer at the initial search warrant hearing expressly stated that
he was unable to vouch for the credibility of the unnamed confidential informant.
(5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.8-11.) It is apparent that the informant was
motivated by the desire to reduce her own drug charges in exchange for providing
information to police. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.4-7.) Prior to the
alleged drug buy, the sole initial details provided by this informant about Mr. Belden
appear to be her belief that she could get "Robin" to sell her marijuana, the informant's
identification of Mr. Belden's photo as the man named "Robin," and that she had told
police that Mr. Belden had a prior, unidentified charge and was on work release.
(5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, L.17 - p.3, L.10.)

There was testimony

regarding an officer observing the purported drug buy take place at the home located in
space 23 of the mobile home park. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.15-18;
p.7, Ls.5-21.)

However, this information turned out to have been erroneous, and

therefore cannot stand as corroborative of anything. See Munoz, Supreme Court Case
No. 34149 at pp.7-8. (See also 512107 Search Warrant Modification Hearing
Tr., generally.)
The officer also testified that there was evidence indicating that the confidential
informant did purchase a small quantity of marijuana. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing
Tr., p.4, Ls.10-12, p.5, L.17 - p.6, L1.) More precisely, the informant went into the
house without marijuana and returned with marijuana. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing
Tr., p.4, Ls.10-12, p.5, L.17 - p.6, L1.) But none of the evidence observed by law
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enforcement regarding this transaction corroborated that it was Mr. Belden who had
participated in this purchase.
There was additionally an audio recording of the alleged drug buy. However, this
audio recording: (1) was never presented to the court at the probable cause hearing;
(2) does not appear to have identified Mr. Belden and the officer could not verify that
Mr. Belden was the person on the recording; and (3) there are significant portions of this
recording that are difficult to hear due to sound interference, including those portions of
the recording wherein the actual drug buy allegedly took place. (5/2/07 Search Warrant
Hearing Tr., p.3, L.19 - p.5, L.3.) In light of this, and particularly given that the officer
could not identify Mr. Belden as the person on the recording, there is simply no basis to
conclude that this evidence could support the informant's allegation that Mr. Belden was
the person who sold her the marijuana,
In this case, the initial warrant was procured and built upon a fragile house of
cards supported only by an unnamed confidential informant whose veracity could not be
established and with a motive to criminally implicate others in order to reduce her own
charges; representations made as to the observations of police that were revealed to be
patently erroneous, with no explanation for this dereliction; and a poor recording of a
purported drug buy that was never played for the court and in which Mr. Belden cannot
be identified as the other person in the drug transaction. No effort was made on the
part of the State to rehabilitate these deficiencies when the second, modified warrant
was sought. This tenuous foundation cannot provide a substantial basis upon which to
conclude that there was probable cause to issue a warrant for Mr. Belden's home.
Once the magistrate became aware of all of these facts at the modification hearing, the
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court could no longer have reasonably found that probable cause existed to support the
issuance of a search warrant for Mr. Belden's home. As such, the district court erred
when it denied Mr. Belden's motion to suppress all of the evidence directly or
derivatively obtained as a result of the search of his home because this search violated
Mr. Belden's Fourth Amendment rights.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Belden respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful
search of his residence.

Additionally, Mr. Belden asks that this Court reverse his

judgment of conviction and sentence and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 25th day of March, 2009.

~~

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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